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COMMENT
PROVING PREEMPTION BY PROVING EXEMPTION:
THE QUANDARY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITIES
MARKET IMPROVEMENT ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
If the securities laws were etched on the stone tablets at Mt.
Sinai, the first commandment would likely read: thou shall not
defraud the investor. Above all, the goal of regulating the securi-
ties field is to protect investors from trickery, deceit, and fraudu-
lent schemes. 1 The states and the federal government have ap-
proached this task differently, and the interaction between
dueling regulations has created a complex set of rules that many
find difficult to navigate. 2 There are obvious drawbacks to both
the under-regulation and the over-regulation of the securities
market, and achieving the proper balance has perplexed lawmak-
ers for decades.3 For instance, under-regulation can threaten the
very core of the market by permitting con artists to evade liability
by manipulating the field and deceiving investors. 4 Over-
1. See Kenneth I. Denos, Blue and Gray Skies: The National Securities Markets Im-
provement Act of 1996 Makes the Case for Uniformity in State Securities Law, 1997 UTAH
L. REV. 101, 104 (1997); Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation
and Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 112 (2004) [hereinafter Dynamic Fe-
deralism]; see also Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congres-
sional Preemption Failure, 22 J. CORP. L. 175, 176 (1997) (describing securities law as a
response to perceived bargaining failures).
2. See Renee M. Jones, Does Federalism Matter? Its Perplexing Role in the Corporate
Governance Debate, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 879, 890 (2006) [hereinafter Does Federalism
Matter?].
3. See generally Does Federalism Matter?, supra note 2 (discussing the competing
interests of investors, state governments, and federal law).
4. See Denos, supra note 1, at 103-04 (describing how regulation of the securities
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regulation, on the other hand, stunts capital formation by forcing
issuers to register their securities with both the federal govern-
ment and state authorities.5
The tug of war between under- and over-regulation prompted
Congress to enact the National Securities Market Improvement
Act ("NSMIA"), which sought to balance investor protection with
the need to streamline the securities registration process. 6 The
basic tool is preemption, as the NSMIA prohibits states from re-
gulating or requiring the registration of federally "covered" secur-
ities, including those securities exempt from federal registration. 7
Though the NSMIA was supposed to revolutionize the securities
registration process,8 the NSMIA's effectiveness has been limited
to exempt private offerings9 made under Rule 506 of Regulation
D.10 One issue that has been bubbling in lower courts is whether
the NSMIA preempts state law whenever a securities offering is
made pursuant to Rule 506, but does not actually comply with the
Rule's substantive requirements. 11 In other words, must a defen-
dant "prove preemption by proving exemption"?12 The remainder
of this comment explores decisions that have confronted this issue
and the significance of the preemption-by-exemption debate. Part
II examines the development of the security field's dual regulato-
ry system and the mechanics of proving NSMIA preemption. Part
III surveys the state and federal decisions addressing the
preemption-by-exemption issue. Part IV analyzes the merits of
the majority and minority arguments and frames the debate
against the continued role of federalism in securities regulation
reform. Part V concludes.
field increased drastically after the stock market crash of 1929); see also Brown v. Earth-
board Sports USA, Inc., 481 F.3d 901, 911 (6th Cir. 2007) (illustrating the need to deter
securities violators from evading state registration requirements).
5. See Denos, supra note 1, at 106 (explaining that issuers "not only had to comply
with increasingly labyrinthine federal requirements, but also faced fifty similarly worded
statutes interpreted by state courts and regulators who viewed their duty to investors
from a completely different perspective").
6. See H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 16-17 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877,
3878-79.
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (2006).
8. See Campbell, supra note 1, at 203.
9. See Douglas J. Dorsch, The National Securities Market Improvement Act: How Im-
proved Is the Securities Market?, 36 DUQ. L. REV. 365, 386 (1998).
10. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2008).
11. See, e.g., Grubka v. WebAccess Int'l, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1269 (D. Colo.
2006).
12. See id.
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECURITIES LAWS AND
NSMIA PREEMPTION
A. Development of the Dual Regulatory System
The states adopted the first measures to protect investors, with
Kansas enacting the first blue sky statute in 1911.13 Even though
every state except Nevada had an investor protection statute be-
fore Congress intervened, early state legislation was largely un-
successful.14 The states' failure led to widespread securities fraud
and was a major catalyst for the stock market crash of 1929.15
Amidst the Great Depression, President Franklin Roosevelt rec-
ognized the need for federal regulation and implored Congress to
enact the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act")16 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act").17 The Se-
curities Act regulated the sale of securities to the general public
in the primary market, and the Exchange Act created the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") to regulate the resale
or exchange of securities in the secondary market.l8 With a ne-
cessary degree of overlap, the two Acts aimed to eradicate fraud
in the marketplace "by requiring proper registration of securities
and full disclosure of all 'material information' to investors."19
While the federal government could have preempted the entire
field of state securities regulation, 20 it merely supplemented ex-
isting state law and created a dual system of regulatory enforce-
13. See Dynamic Federalism, supra note 1, at 111.
14. Id. at 111-12.
15. See Denos, supra note 1, at 104.
16. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, sec. 1, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006)).
17. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, sec. 1, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (1994)); see also Denos, supra note 1, at 104 (describing
the heightened speculation that proceeded the stock market crash and gave the 1932 Con-
gress the political wherewithal to begin regulating the securities field); Dorsch, supra note
9, at 367 (explaining Roosevelt's New Deal legislation).
18. See Michael W. Ott, Delaware Strikes Back: Newcastle Partners and the Fight for
State Corporate Autonomy, 82 IND. L.J. 159, 164-65 (2007).
19. Dorsch, supra note 9, at 367.
20. Congress arguably has the power to preempt the entire field of interstate securi-
ties regulation under the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which gives Con-
gress the authority to "regulate Commerce ... among the several States." Id. For a good
explanation of the logistics of implementing a completely federal scheme, see Dorsch, su-
pra note 9, at 393.
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ment. 21 The division of power was fueled by competing philoso-
phies: the federal government believed the best way to protect in-
vestors was by eliciting full disclosure of investment opportuni-
ties, and the states believed a stronger system would permit state
authorities to review the merits of securities before they could be
sold in their jurisdiction. 22 Though theoretically opposed, the two
philosophies were designed to work together to avoid the pitfalls
that precipitated the 1929 crash.23
As the dual regulatory system evolved, the cry for uniformity
became louder and louder.24 The basic problem was that different
states had different laws,25 and even if the states had the same
laws, they would be interpreted differently.26 Because the steep
transaction costs of federal and multi-state compliance stymied
many small issuers, capital formation was stunted.27 While
21. See Ott, supra note 18, at 164.
22. See Denos, supra note 1, at 110-11 (stating that the federal system was premised
on the "notion that the availability of information would allow the market to evaluate in-
vestments, but would not ... try to keep investors from making bad bargains," while the
states acted like 'local cops on the beat"' to patrol the "worthiness of securities issued in
their locale" (citing Douglas M. Branson & Karl Shumpei Okamoto, The Supreme Court's
Literalism and the Definition of "Security" in State Courts, 50 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1043,
1045-48 (1993))); see also Campbell, supra note 1, at 177 (describing the disclosure versus
merit review distinction between federal and state regulatory regimes as one of procedure
versus substance); Dorsch, supra note 9, at 368 (pointing out that the "SEC does not regu-
late the price of securities," but "merely ensures that investors are provided with adequate
information when purchasing securities by subjecting issuers to a detailed registration
and disclosure regime.").
23. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 57-59 (3d ed. 1989);
see also Denos, supra note 1, at 111 (describing the interaction between federal and state
securities regulations); Does Federalism Matter?, supra note 2, at 889 (acknowledging con-
ventional wisdom that states exercise local enforcement duties and the SEC handles set-
ting national policy objectives).
24. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 43 ("It would be difficult to think of any
area of the law where uniformity is so essential."); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-864, at 39
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3920, 3920 (chronicling the systemic problems with
the dual regulatory system).
25. See Denos, supra note 1, at 125 (describing state securities laws as "a balkanized
array of statutes with little resemblance to each other" that "were extremely imposing for
multistate issuers").
26. See id. at 126 (explaining that interpretation of verbatim provisions of the Uni-
form Securities Act varied as much as the judges and regulators attempting to interpret
them).
27. See Does Federalism Matter?, supra note 2, at 889-90 (explaining how the lack of
uniformity caused corporations to complain "that the system was duplicative and wasteful
because it required companies to contend with the costs and inconvenience of complying
with federal securities laws as well [as] the laws of every state in which their securities
traded"). Apple Computer's initial public offering is a good example of how varied state
regulation can stunt capital growth. See Denos, supra note 1, at 112. In 1980, twenty
states refused to approve the offering because it was "too risky," despite being underwrit-
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$50,000 transaction costs were a drop in the bucket for mega-
corporations, smaller companies were often deterred from raising
startup or investment capital. 28 Congress, the states, and the
SEC attempted to quell these concerns through mechanisms such
as the Uniform Securities Act,29 the Uniform Limited Offering
Exemption,30 and the Small Corporate Offering Registration,31
but each attempt failed to fix the systemic ills of the dual regula-
tory system. 32
Discouraged by the omnipresent failure to unify state and fed-
eral law,33 Congress decided to alleviate some of the tension by
preempting state regulatory authority, thereby permitting certain
ten by Morgan Stanley and achieving a very high appraisal. See id. As we know now, the
offering was very lucrative for investors.
28. See Dorsch, supra note 9, at 392 ("Compliance costs of $100,000 are more easily
swallowed by an issuer of $7,000,000 of securities than by an issuer of only $250,000.").
29. The Uniform Securities Act, which was designed to unify state law and coordinate
the interpretation of it with the federal system, was approved by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1956. UNIF. SEC. ACT (amended 1988), 7C
U.L.A. 215 prefatory note (2006). The Act, adopted by forty-one states, embraced the tradi-
tional state philosophy of merit review. See generally Denos, supra note 1, at 125-26 (dis-
cussing various provisions of the Uniform Securities Act and its subsequent failure to
bring uniformity to the state of securities regulation).
30. The Uniform Limited Offering Exemption ("ULOE") is largely a derivation of a
Securities Act provision which exempted private securities offerings from federal registra-
tion requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006) (exempting transactions "not involving
any public offering"); Denos, supra note 1, at 126. The ULOE is significant to the NSMIA
because it prompted the SEC to develop Regulation D, which is a series of rules providing
safe harbors for issuers seeking exemption under section 4(2) of the Securities Act. See
Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-508 (2008). For more detailed discussion of Regulation
D, see infra Part II.B. For a discussion of the ULOE's failures to achieve uniformity, see
generally Campbell, supra note 1, at 188-89.
31. The Small Corporate Offering Registration ("SCOR") was designed by the SEC
and several states to alleviate the difficulties of multistate compliance to produce a single
form for offerings under Regulation A or Rule 504 of Regulation D. See Denos, supra note
1, at 129. For an example of a manual used to help companies complete the registration
process, see N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS'N, N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASS'N SMALL COMPANY
OFFERING REGISTRATION MANUAL (1999), available at http://www.nasaa.org/industry_
RegulatoryResources/CorporationFinance/564.cfm. (follow "Issuer's Manual for Form U-
7" hyperlink") (last visited Dec. 11, 2008). Though the adoption of SCOR did not repair the
systemic ills of the dual regulatory system, it was significantly more successful in helping
small issuers than the Uniform Securities Act or the ULOE. See Denos, supra note 1, at
130.
32. See generally Denos, supra note 1, at 124-30 (examining the botched attempts at
unifying the securities field).
33. In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt admitted that "[tihe current system of dual federal-
state regulation is not the system that Congress--or the Commission-would create today
if we were designing a new system." See S. REP. No 104-293, at 2 (1996), available at 1996
WL 367191.
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securities offerings to comply with just one set of rules. 34 The
touchstone pieces of federal preemption legislation were the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"),35 the
NSMIA,36 and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998 ("SLUSA").37 Commentators generally view the NSMIA as
the most detrimental piece of federal regulation to the dual regu-
latory system. 38 It was enacted, after all, with the express pur-
pose of "eliminat[ing] the costs and burdens of duplicative and
unnecessary regulation by, as a general rule, designating the
Federal government as the exclusive regulator of national offer-
ings of securities."39 Similar to Roosevelt's New Deal legislation,
Congress did not preempt the entire securities field, but balanced
the need to reduce compliance costs with the established goal of
investor protection. 40 Principally, states retained the authority to
investigate and prosecute securities fraud within their jurisdic-
tion, to require the notice filing of any document filed with SEC,
and to require the payment of filing or registration fees in effect
before NSMIA enactment. 41
34. See Does Federalism Matter?, supra note 2, at 894 (explaining that the preemption
legislation "overturned a seventy-year tradition of federal deference to state authority in
the securities arena"); Dynamic Federalism, supra note 1, at 113-14 (describing a series of
federal attacks on state regulatory power in the securities field); see also Campbell, supra
note 1, at 196 (describing the essence of preemption as the notion that "states no longer
have the authority to enact rules requiring the registration or merit qualification of cer-
tain securities or with respect to certain transactions").
35. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.). The PSLRA dramatically changed securities fraud claims by raising plead-
ing standards and enacting lead plaintiff provisions for securities class actions. See id; see
also Dynamic Federalism, supra note 1, at 113 n.27.
36. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C.).
37. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C.). The SLUSA preempts class action suits for securities fraud based on
state law when the securities at issue are a "covered security." See Dynamic Federalism,
supra note 1, at 113-14 & n.29.
38. See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A
Case for Reallocation of Regulatory Responsibilities, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 499 (2000) ("[In
passing the NSMIA, Congress] inflicted a severe, if not fatal, wound on the dual system of
securities regulation that had protected investors and their marketplace since the end of
the Great Depression.").
39. H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3878.
40. See id. at 17, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3879; see also Denos, supra note 1,
at 131 (stating that NSMIA advocates believed the legislation "would simultaneously low-
er the cost of raising money and increase investor protection").
41. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c) (2006). The preservation of state authority corresponds with the
NSMIA's stated intent to permit state governments "to regulate small, regional, or intras-
tate securities offerings, and to bring actions pursuant to State laws and regulations pro-
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Detractors of federal preemption legislation may have valid
gripes about the NSMIA's effectiveness, 42 but Congress's decision
to "rethink the system of dual Federal and State securities regu-
lation" was a step in the right direction.43 The simple fact is that
federal preemption is a viable alternative to the patchwork quilt
of multi-state regulation. 44
B. The Mechanics of NSMIA Preemption
The foregoing illustrates the reactive nature of securities regu-
lation. Investors suffer from an under-regulated field, and the law
reacts with a spattering of state and federal regulation. In turn,
investors suffer from an over-regulated field, and the law reacts
by attempting to unify a dual system, ultimately choosing one
regulatory level over the other.45 The following explores one of
the latest links in the reactive chain, the NSMIA preemption of
state law for covered securities.
At its core, the NSMIA prohibits states from regulating federal-
ly covered securities.46 Covered securities include transactions
hibiting fraud and deceit, including broker-dealer sales practices abuses." See H.R. REP.
NO. 104-622, at 16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3878.
42. The many arguments for securities reform go well beyond the scope of this com-
ment. For general views regarding the failure of the NSMIA and recommended changes to
securities regulation, see generally Campbell, supra note 1; Dorsch, supra note 9; Lanny A.
Schwartz, Suggestions for Procedural Reform in Securities Market Regulation, 1 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 409 (2007); Warren, supra note 38.
43. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877,
3878.
44. For a particularly scathing critique of blue sky regulations, see J. Sinclair
Armstrong, The Blue Sky Laws, 44 VA. L. REV. 713, 714 (1958). The former SEC commis-
sioner chastises blue sky laws for their "special meaning-a meaning full of complexities,
surprises, unsuspected liabilities for transactions normal and usual-in short, a crazy-
quilt of state regulations no longer significant or meaningful in purpose, and usually stul-
tifying in effect, or just plain useless." Id. at 714-15.
45. See generally Does Federalism Matter?, supra note 2 (discussing the tug of war
between investors, state governments, and federal law).
46. In pertinent part, Title 15, section 77r(a) of the United States Code states:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no law, rule, regulation, or or-
der, or other administrative action of any State or any political subdivision
thereof-
(1) requiring, or with respect to, registration or qualification of securities, or
registration or qualification of securities transactions, shall directly or indi-
rectly apply to a security that-
(A) is a covered security; or
(B) will be a covered security upon completion of the transaction;
(2) shall directly or indirectly prohibit, limit, or impose any conditions upon
the use of-
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that are exempt from federal registration under the Securities
Act.47 If a security is exempt, then the issuer is not required to
register its offering with the SEC prior to a security being offered
or sold. 48 There are a number of transactions exempted from the
registration requirement, the most pertinent of which are "trans-
actions by an issuer not involving any public offering."49 To pro-
vide a sense of clarity to the private offering exemption, the SEC
adopted Regulation D, which provides a safe harbor for issuers
complying with the Regulation's substantive requirements. 50
Regulation D includes private offerings made pursuant to Rule
506, which have experienced the most tangible change since the
enactment of the NSMIA's preemption scheme.51
A brief explanation of the interaction between Rule 506 offer-
ings and NSMIA preemption is helpful in framing the preemp-
tion-by-exemption debate. In the typical situation, an issuer will
invoke Rule 506 when he is selling securities to a private individ-
ual or investment company and does not want to register the sale
(A) with respect to a covered security described in subsection (b) of this sec-
tion, any offering document that is prepared by or on behalf of the issuer; or
(B) any proxy statement, report to shareholders, or other disclosure document
relating to a covered security or the issuer thereof that is required to be and
is filed with the Commission or any national securities organization regis-
tered under section 78o-3 of this title, except that this subparagraph does not
apply to the laws, rules, regulations, or orders, or other administrative ac-
tions of the State of incorporation of the issuer; or
(3) shall directly or indirectly prohibit, limit, or impose conditions, based on
the merits of such offering or issuer, upon the offer or sale of any security de-
scribed in paragraph (1).
15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (2006).
47. Id. § 77r(b); see also Campbell, supra note 1, at 196-99 (explaining the Act's defi-
nition of covered securities). Securities are also covered if they are listed on a national ex-
change, are issued by an investment company registered under the Investment Company
Act of 1940, or are sold to a qualified purchaser. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b).
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r. For an example of state registration requirements, see GA.
CODE ANN. § 10-5-5(a) (West 2000) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to offer or to sell
any securities to any person in this state unless: (1) They are subject to an effective regis-
tration statement under this chapter; (2) The security or transaction is exempt under Code
Section 10-5-8 or Code Section 10-5-9, respectively; or (3) The security is a federally cov-
ered security.").
49. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77d. Though there are multiple exemptions available to vari-
ous types of issuers and transactions, this comment will only explore exemption under
Rule 506 of Regulation D.
50. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (2008).
51. See Campbell, supra note 1, at 205; see also Dorsch, supra note 9, at 386 (asserting
that with regard to 506 offerings, the NSMIA has finally "created a situation which actual-
ly benefits the issuer").
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formally with the SEC.52 Though there is no limitation on the to-
tal offering price, 53 in order to be exempt from registration, an is-
suer must meet three principal conditions.54 First, the private of-
fering must satisfy the general conditions of Rules 501 and 502,
which define the levels of purchaser sophistication, limit the com-
bination of multiple offerings which would evade Regulation D
requirements, and prohibit general solicitation.55 Second, while
there is no limit on the amount of accredited investors that may
participate in the offer, there can be no more than thirty-five pur-
chasers. 56 Third, each purchaser, or non-accredited investor,
must possess sufficient "knowledge and experience in financial
and business matters" to evaluate capably the merits and risks of
the investment.57 While Regulation D specifically accounts for an
honest failure to comply with an insignificant condition of the ex-
emption,58 prudent investors file a Form D with the SEC, notify-
ing the Commission of the impending or completed sale of unre-
gistered securities. 59 Should an issuer fail to meet the require-
ments of Rule 506, the securities are not exempt from registration
with the SEC, and the purchaser of the securities may bring an
action for the sale of unregistered securities to rescind the trans-
action and recover the consideration paid.60
When an issuer makes a private offering pursuant to Rule 506
of Regulation D and complies with all of the Rule's substantive
requirements, the offering will be exempt from registration with
the SEC.61 Under the NSMIA's preemption scheme, the exempt
private offering will be considered a covered security and neither
the transaction nor the issuer will be subject to state regulation
or liability.62 But what happens when an issuer fails to meet a
mandatory requirement of Rule 506, and the securities offering is
not actually exempt from federal registration? Is the federal gov-
52. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. The Rule 506 exemption is an issuer-only exemption. Id.
53. See id.; see also Dorsch, supra note 9, at 385 (delineating the requirements of a
Rule 506 offering).
54. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
55. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-502.
56. See id. § 230.506. An "accredited investor" is defined by Rule 501. Id. § 230.501(a).
57. Id. § 230.506b(2)(ii).
58. See id. § 230.508.
59. See id. § 230.503.
60. See 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2006).
61. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
62. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(d)(2), 77r(b)(4)(D) (2006).
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ernment still the exclusive regulator of all private offerings pur-
porting to comply with Rule 506? Or are the states permitted to
enforce their blue sky laws against violators who claim Rule 506
compliance, but do not actually meet the Rule's substantive re-
quirements? In other words, when an issuer finds himself a state
law defendant for the sale of unregistered securities, must he
"prove preemption ... by proving exemption"?63 The answer, it
turns out, is an important one. Not only is the statute of limita-
tions much shorter under the NSMIA than under the blue sky
laws of most states,64 engaging in the preemption-by-exemption
debate may affect the role of federalism in future securities
reform efforts.
III. PREEMPTION-BY- EXEMPTION JURISPRUDENCE
The issue of whether the NSMIA preempts state blue sky law
when an unregistered security was offered pursuant to, but did
not actually qualify for, a federal exemption first reached the
courts in 2002,65 six years after the NSMIA was enacted.66 Since
then, state and federal decisions have carved out clear majority
and minority positions. The majority view, first articulated in
Buist v. Time Domain Corporation, only preempts state law when
the unregistered security offering actually complies with the fed-
eral exemption requirements of Rule 506 of Regulation D.67 The
minority view, stated first by Temple v. Gorman, preempts state
law whenever the unregistered security is offered pursuant to a
federal exemption, regardless of whether the offering meets the
exemption's substantive requirements. 68 The following case sur-
vey illustrates that recent decisions, including one from the Sixth
Circuit,69 have trended towards the majority position, relying on
both statutory and policy-based arguments.
63. See Grubka v. WebAccess Int'l, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1269 (D. Colo. 2006)
(framing the preemption-by-exemption issue).
64. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77m, with OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (West 2000 & Cum.
Supp. 2008).
65. See Temple v. Gorman, 201 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
66. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
67. 926 So. 2d 290, 297-98 (Ala. 2005).
68. See Temple, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 1244.
69. See Brown v. Earthboard Sports USA, Inc., 481 F.3d 901 (6th Cir. 2007).
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A. Temple v. Gorman
Although several cases referenced the preemption-by-exemp-
tion dilemma prior to 2002,70 Temple was the first published de-
cision to examine the matter with any finality.71 Temple con-
cerned the private sale of eight million shares of eCampus.com
stock.72 The purchasers of the eCampus securities sued the sel-
lers to rescind the sale, alleging that the securities were not prop-
erly registered with the SEC or the state of Florida.73 The sellers,
who filed a Form D with the SEC, argued that Florida's blue sky
law was preempted because the securities were sold pursuant to
Rule 506 of Regulation D.74 The investors claimed that the offer-
ing was not exempt from federal registration because it failed to
comply with Rule 506's substantive requirements. 75 Because the
securities were not exempt from federal registration, the inves-
tors contended, they were not covered securities and Florida law
was not preempted. 76
In a case of first impression, the Temple court relied on the
Congressional purpose of the NSMIA "to ... eliminate the costs
and burdens of duplicative and unnecessary regulation by, as a
general rule, designating the Federal government as the exclu-
sive regulator of national offerings of securities." 77 Without ana-
lyzing the statute itself, the court summarily found the eCampus
stock a federally "covered security" because it was sold pursuant
70. See, e.g., Zuri-Invest AG v. Natwest Fin. Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 189, 197 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (stating that the NSMIA does not automatically preempt state securities fraud
claims); Myers v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. C-98-3532, 1999 WL 696082, at *9 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 23, 1999) (finding that plaintiffs claims for discriminatory bid practices were
preempted by the NSMIA pursuant to SEC Regulation M).
71. See Temple, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 1244.
72. Id. at 1239.
73. Id. at 1240. The typical federal cause of action is brought under Section 12(a)(1) of
the Securities Act for the sale of unregistered securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2006).
74. Temple, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 1240. The defendants comtended that the federal claim
was time-barred by the Securities Act's one-year statute of limitations and that the state
claim was preempted by the NSMIA. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2006). The court heard,
and ultimately agreed with, these arguments on defendants' motion to dismiss. Temple,
201 F. Supp. 2d at 1244.
75. Temple, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 1243. Specifically, the plaintiffs maintained that "the
presence of unaccredited investors triggered certain information and auditing require-
ments, with which the private placement did not comply." Id. at 1240.
76. Id. at 1243.
77. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3877, 3878). Surprisingly, the court seemed to focus more on congressional intent than the
statute itself. Id. at 1244.
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to Rule 506 of Regulation D.78 The court explained, "[r]egardless
of whether the private placement actually complied with the
substantive requirements of Regulation D or Rule 506, the securi-
ties sold to Plaintiffs are federal 'covered securities' because they
were sold pursuant to those rules."79 As a result, the Temple rule
preempts state blue sky law whenever the offering is made pur-
suant to Rule 506, regardless of actual compliance.8 0
B. Lillard v. Stockton
After Temple, the Northern District of Oklahoma addressed the
preemption-by-exemption problem in Lillard v. Stockton.81 Lil-
lard presented a securities fraud case where hedge fund investors
sued administrators of the fund for breach of fiduciary duty, se-
curities fraud, negligence, and the sale of unregistered securi-
ties.8 2 The cause of action for the sale of unregistered securities
included federal and state claims, both of which came to the court
on the defendants' motion to dismiss.83 The defendants cited
Temple, arguing that the federal claim was time-barred and the
state claim, which benefited from a longer limitations period, was
preempted by the NSMIA.84 Like Temple, the Lillard court refe-
renced the NSMIA's congressional intent to reduce the burdens of
a duplicative regulatory system by appointing the federal gov-
ernment as the sole regulator of national securities offerings.85
The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plain-
tiffs claim for the sale of unregistered securities under Oklahoma
law, holding that because the securities were offered pursuant to
Rule 506, the NSMIA preempted the application of Oklahoma
law.8 6 Though implicitly approving Temple, the court noted that
the NSMIA preemption argument, which was raised in the de-
78. Id. at 1243.
79. Id. at 1244.
80. Id.
81. 267 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (N.D. Okla. 2003).
82. Id. at 1090-91.
83. Id. at 1114; see also 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 301,
408(a)(1) (2002) (repealed 2004).
84. Lillard, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 1114.
85. See id. at 1115.
86. Id. at 1116.
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fendants' reply brief, was never countered by the plaintiffs in
their brief or at oral argument.8 7
C. Buist v. Time Domain Corp.
After two federal decisions found preemption regardless of
Regulation D compliance, the Supreme Court of Alabama rejected
the Temple approach in Buist v. Time Domain Corp.88 There,
Buist purchased Time Domain stock and debt securities directly
from the corporation in a private offering.89 A few months later,
Buist discovered that new investors were taking control of Time
Domain and under the reorganization, each Time Domain share-
holder would receive one share of the new class of stock for every
sixty-nine shares of existing Time Domain stock.90 Buist objected
to the reorganization and demanded payment plus interest on his
debt securities. 91 His demands were rejected and Buist sued Time
Domain under a number of legal theories, such as minority
shareholder oppression, bad faith, and violation of the Alabama
Securities Act ("ASA") for the sale of unregistered securities. 92
Time Domain filed a motion for partial summary judgment based
on NSMIA preemption. 93 Time Domain argued that the securities
were "covered securities" because they were sold pursuant to Rule
506 of Regulation D and, as a result, federal law preempted any
ASA violation.94 Buist argued that the securities were not cov-
ered because Time Domain failed to prove that the private offer-
ing actually complied with the substantive requirements of Rule
87. Id.
88. 926 So. 2d 290, 297-98 (Ala. 2005). Prior to Buist, the Western District of Ken-
tucky referenced Temple in an unpublished decision. See Myers v. OTR Media, Inc., 2005
WL 2100996, at *5 n.2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 30, 2005). Although the Myers court specifically
mentioned that its holding relieved the court from expressing an opinion on Temple and
Lillard, see id., the court denied a motion for summary judgment because there were ques-
tions of fact concerning the offeror's compliance with Rule 506. See id. at *5. The court's
decision to punt the Temple issue is questionable, then, because the court acknowledged
that the issuer's compliance with Rule 506 was a material issue of genuine fact, which
precluded summary judgment. See id. Temple, of course, held that compliance with Rule
506 was immaterial. See Temple v. Gorman, 201 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1244 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
89. Buist, 926 So. 2d at 292.
90. Id. The stock exchange scheme is referred to as a "reverse split." Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. Time Domain buttressed its motion for partial summary judgment with evi-
dence of two Form Ds filed with the Alabama Securities Commission and the Commis-
sion's findings that both filings met its requirements. Id.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
506.95 The trial court granted Time Domain's partial summary
judgment motion and Buist appealed.96
The Supreme Court of Alabama first noted that federal
preemption was an affirmative defense with the burden of proof
on the defendant.97 After outlining the interaction between the
ASA and the NSMIA,98 the court examined the parties' compet-
ing arguments. 99 Relying on Temple and Lillard, Time Domain
contended that exemption was a separate analysis from preemp-
tion.lOO In other words, a defendant with the burden of proving
federal preemption is not required to prove that the challenged
securities sale was actually exempt from federal registration, but
only that the sale was offered pursuant to Rule 506 of Regulation
D.101 Buist argued that because exemption and preemption were
functionally equivalent, the only way to prove preemption was to
prove that a securities sale met the requirements of Regulation
D.102 The court agreed with Buist, holding that "a failure to
comply with a requirement of Rule 506 'voids' the exemption, the-
reby eliminating the possibility of preemption."103 Though ac-
knowledging Temple and Lillard as persuasive authority, the
court rejected their line of reasoning as "ipse dixit without any ac-
companying analysis."104 Specifically, the court emphasized Tem-
ple's lack of caselaw or supporting authority and Lillard's bare re-
95. Id. at 292-93.
96. Id. at 293.
97. Id. The court emphasized that summary judgment may only be granted where
there is no issue of material fact regarding an affirmative defense. Id. (citing Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Smitherman, 743 So. 2d 442, 445 (Ala. 1999)).
98. Id. at 294. The ASA generally requires securities sales to be registered with the
state unless they are exempted by the Alabama Securities Commission or preempted by
federal law. See id. Time Domain was relying on federal preemption, which follows the
statutory scheme outlined supra part II.B.
99. Buist, 926 So. 2d at 295-96.
100. Id. at 296 (presenting the defendant's argument that "preemption entails a much
lower burden than proving exemption").
101. Id.
102. Id. at 295-96.
103. Id. at 296. In addition to rejecting Temple's logic, the court based its holding on In
re Cherokee Energy Co., Order No. CD-2003-02, (Ala. Sec. Comm'n Feb. 4, 2003), http://
www.asc.state.al.us/Orders/2003/CD-2003-0002.pdf, a case decided by the Alabama Secur-
ities Commission. Buist, 926 So. 2d at 296. In Cherokee Energy, the Commission found
that a dealer violated Rule 502, which prohibited general solicitation, by selling unregis-
tered securities to Alabama residents. Cherokee Energy, at 4; see Buist, 926 So. 2d at 296.
The Commission ordered the dealer to stop selling the securities because the sales failed to
comply with Regulation D, voiding the federal exemption and "covered securities" status
provided for in the NSMIA. Cherokee Energy, at 4-5; see Buist, 926 So. 2d at 296.
104. Buist, 926 So. 2d at 297.
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liance on Temple.105 Because Time Domain's Form Ds were not
sufficient to prove compliance with Rule 506, the burden of feder-
al preemption never shifted to Buist to demonstrate an issue of
material fact.106 Therefore, the court reversed Time Domain's
motion for partial summary judgment and remanded for further
proceedings. 107
D. AFA Private Equity Fund v. Miresco Investment Services
In 2005, the Eastern District of Michigan decided AFA Private
Equity Fund v. Miresco Investment Services.108 The plaintiffs
brought a cause of action under Michigan's Uniform Securities
Act for the sale of unregistered securities, which the defendant
argued should be dismissed due to NSMIA preemption.109
Though some authorities cite Miresco as tacit approval of
Buist,110 the court's approach is not that simple. Just as the Su-
preme Court of Alabama did in Buist, the court denied the defen-
dant's motion for partial summary judgment because the defen-
dant failed to meet its burden of proving federal exemption.1 11
What remains unclear, however, is whether the court required
actual Regulation D exemption to prove NSMIA preemption. In
its abbreviated analysis, the court failed to mention any specifics
of the securities offering or whether the defendant had filed Form
105. Id. It is somewhat ironic that the Buist Court derided Temple for its lack of au-
thority. After all, Buist itself only rested on the shaky pillars of an Alabama Securities
Commission decision that was entitled to no deference whatsoever. See id. at 296.
106. Id. at 298. Earlier, the court noted that the Alabama Securities Commission did
not review the Form Ds, which constituted notice filing, for substantive compliance with
federal exemption procedures. Id. at 295.
107. Id. at 298. Buist also contained concurring and dissenting opinions. Justice Lyons
concurred, but only to emphasize that Time Domain showed a future promise to comply
with Rule 506. Id. (Lyons, J., concurring). If Time Domain had shown more, the burden
would have shifted to Buist to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Id. A dissent
by Justice Harwood also failed to offer any insight into the preemption-by-exemption de-
bate. See id. at 298-303 (Harwood, J., dissenting). Instead of contradicting the main pre-
mise of the majority's rationale, Harwood focused on Buist's failed procedure to preserve
the preemption argument and the specifics of Rule 506 compliance. See id. at 298-302.
108. No. 02-74650, 2005 WL 2417116 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2005).
109. Id. at *4, *9.
110. See Brown v. Earthboard Sports USA, Inc., 481 F.3d 901, 910 (6th Cir. 2007).
111. See Miresco, 2005 WL at *9 (stating that it was the defendant's burden to "estab-
lish that the exemption applies and that all conditions of the exemption have been satis-
fied"); see also Buist, 926 So. 2d at 298 (stating that the defendant failed to meet its bur-
den of "showing that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to its exemption under
Rule 506").
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Ds with federal or Michigan authorities.112 Perhaps more telling
is the opinion's failure to cite Temple, Lillard, or Buist.11 3 The
questions surrounding Miresco's analysis, and the fact that it was
an unpublished opinion,11 4 outweigh most of its precedential au-
thority in the preemption-by-exemption debate.
E. Pinnacle Communications International, Inc. v. American
Family Mortgage Corp.
Unlike prior NSMIA preemption cases, Pinnacle Communica-
tions International, Inc. v. American Family Mortgage Corp. did
not stem from the classic scenario of soured investors suing to in-
validate the sale of unregistered securities.1 15 Pinnacle, an Inter-
net shopping company, sold securities to American Family in a
private offering negotiated between the parties.11 6 When Ameri-
can Family defaulted on its payment, Pinnacle sued for breach of
contract.1 17 American Family counterclaimed for the sale of un-
registered securities under federal and Minnesota law.11 8 On
cross-motions for summary judgment, the Minnesota District
Court denied summary judgment on the federal claim because
there were material issues of fact regarding Pinnacle's com-
pliance with the substantive requirements of Regulation D.119
Despite its uncertainty over whether Pinnacle was actually ex-
empt from federal registration under Regulation D, the court held
that the NSMIA preempted American Family's state law claim
because Pinnacle "purported to sell its stock under the Rule 506
exemption."20 In strong language, the court explained, "[w]hen
an offering purports to be exempt under federal Regulation D,
112. See Miresco, 2005 WL at *1-3.
113. See id. at *9.
114. Id. at*l.
115. See 417 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (D. Minn. 2006).
116. See id. at 1076-77. During negotiations and in the Subscription Agreement, Amer-
ican Family's president represented that his company was an "accredited investor" within
the meaning of Regulation D. Id. at 1077. Further, Pinnacle filed a Form D with the SEC
claiming an exemption from federal registration. Id. at 1079.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1079-80.
119. Id. at 1086-87. In particular, the court found issues with whether Pinnacle sold to
unaccredited investors without the proper documentation and disclosure required by Rules
505 and 506. Id. at 1086. The court also rejected Pinnacle's argument for a Rule 508 resi-
dual exemption. Id. at 1086-87.
120. Id. at 1087.
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any allegation of improper registration is covered exclusively by
federal law."121 Though it adopted the Temple-Lillard line of rea-
soning, the Pinnacle court did not invoke the congressional intent
behind NSMIA or discuss any issues of statutory interpreta-
tion.122 Rather, it merely outlined the NSMIA preemption scheme
and cited Temple and Lillard without further analysis. 123
F. Hamby v. Clearwater Consulting Concepts
Until Hamby v. Clearwater Consulting Concepts, the decisions
in the preemption-by-exemption debate formed a predictable di-
chotomy between federal and state courts. 124 Of the four pub-
lished decisions, three federal opinions held that the NSMIA
preempted state blue sky law whenever a securities offering was
made pursuant to Regulation D, regardless of whether the offer-
ing was actually exempt from federal registration.125 The one
state court to address the issue held the opposite, that the
NSMIA only preempted state blue sky law when the securities of-
fering complied with Regulation D and was actually exempt from
federal registration. 126 Unsurprisingly, the federal courts favored
preemption while the state court favored preservation of state au-
thority. In Hamby, however, the Eastern District of Arkansas ex-
plicitly rejected Temple and its progeny,127 concluding that "the
only way to assert federal preemption is to first show that an ex-
emption from federal registration actually applies."128
In Hamby, an Arkansas investor purchased $256,000 in unre-
gistered securities from Clearwater Consulting Concepts, a li-
mited liability partnership organized in the U.S. Virgin Is-
lands.129 The promised tax benefits from the investment never
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See 428 F. Supp. 2d 915 (E.D. Ark. 2006).
125. See Pinnacle, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1087; Lillard v. Stockton, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1081,
1116 (N.D. Okla. 2003); Temple v. Gorman, 201 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1244 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
126. See Buist v. Time Domain Corp., 926 So. 2d 290, 296-98 (Ala. 2005). Miresco has
been viewed by some to adopt the Buist line of reasoning, but the court's analysis is more
appropriately characterized as dicta. See AFA Private Equity Fund v. Miresco Inv. Serv.,
No. 02-74650, 2005 WL 2417116 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2005); see also discussion supra Part
III.D.
127. See Hamby, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 921 n.2.
128. See id. at 921.
129. Id. at 916-17.
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materialized and Hamby sued Clearwater for the sale of unregis-
tered securities in violation of Arkansas law.130 Clearwater
raised the affirmative defense of NSMIA preemption, and argued
that "the sale of the security to Hamby was a covered security be-
cause it was offered as such, regardless of whether the defendants
actually complied with Rule 506 of Regulation D or not."131 Citing
Temple, Clearwater relied on language in its partnership agree-
ment which stated that any securities sale was made pursuant to
an exemption from federal registration.132 Because Congress did
not entirely preempt the field of securities regulation, the court
explained, the NSMIA only preempted state law attempting to
regulate a covered security.133 In a footnote to the opinion, the
court declined to follow Temple, harping on its complete lack of
supporting authority.134 Without supporting affidavits or deposi-
tion testimony, Clearwater was unable to meet its burden of prov-
ing Regulation D exemption, and the court denied its motion for
summary judgment. 135
G. Grubka v. WebAccess International, Inc.
After the Hamby Court became the first federal court to align
itself with Buist,136 the Colorado District Court continued the
trend in Grubka v. WebAccess International, Inc.137 The case
arose when the Grubkas' $38,411 investment in WebAccess
soured, prompting a suit for securities fraud and malfeasance
based on the sale of unregistered securities under federal and
Colorado law. 138 WebAccess argued that the NMSIA preempted
130. Id. at 917. Hamby also brought causes of action for breach of contract and unjust
enrichment. Id.
131. Id. at 920. Before reaching Clearwater's preemption argument, the court disposed
of a threshold procedural issue. Id. at 919. Clearwater failed to file a Form D with the
SEC, but the court found that "filing a Form D [was] not a condition to obtaining an ex-
emption under Rules 504-506." Id. at 920.
132. Id. at 919-20.
133. Id. at 920-21 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(1) (2006); Dudek v. Prudential Sec., Inc.,
295 F.3d 875, 879 (8th Cir. 2002)).
134. Id. at 921 n.2 ("Contrary to Temple, most commentators have stated the obvious: a
security has to actually be a 'covered security' before federal preemption applies.") (citing
Hugh H. Makens, Blue Sky Practice-Part I: Doing it Right, SL075 ALI-ABA COURSE OF
STUDY 549, 554 (Mar. 16, 2006)).
135. Id. at 921, 923.
136. See id. at 921 n.2.
137. 445 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1269-70 (D. Colo. 2006).
138. Id. at 1261, 1263.
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the Colorado blue sky claim because the unregistered securities
were offered pursuant to Rule 506 of Regulation D.139 The Grub-
kas contended that WebAcess was required to "prove preemption
of the state law claim by proving exemption under the
NSMIA."140 The court agreed with the Grubkas, asserting that
the Temple Court erred by reading the "pursuant to" language in-
to the statute.i 41 The Grubka Court buttressed its statutory read-
ing with the need to avoid the "unsavory proposition" of permit-
ting defendants to "eviscerate" the investor protections of state
blue sky laws by simply "declaiming... compliance with Regula-
tion D."142 Outside of Temple's appeal to Congressional intent, 143
Grubka represents the first of several forays into the policy be-
hind the preemption-by-exemption debate.144
H. In re Blue Flame Energy Corp.
In re Blue Flame Energy Corp. was an appeal brought by the
Ohio Department of Commerce, Division of Securities (the "Divi-
sion").145 The Division contended that the trial court erroneously
ruled that the NSMIA prevented the Division from enforcing
Ohio's blue sky laws against issuers who claimed a Rule 506 ex-
emption, but did not meet the Rule's substantive require-
ments.1 46 Because Blue Flame's private offering was not exempt
from federal registration, the Division argued that the offering
was not a federally covered security and the NSMIA did not
preempt Ohio's blue sky laws. 147
139. Id. at 1269.
140. Id. As expected, WebAccess relied on Temple, see Moving Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint and Brief in Support 23-24, Grubka v. We-
bAccess Int'l, Inc., No. 05-cv-02483-LTB (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2006), while the Grubkas cited
Buist for authority. See Grubka, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1269.
141. Id. at 1270 ("If Congress had intended that an offeror's representation of exemp-
tion should suffice it could have said so, but did not.").
142. Id.
143. See Temple v. Gorman, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1243 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 104-622, at 16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3878).
144. For a more detailed analysis, see infra Part IV.A-B.
145. 871 N.E.2d 1227, 1234 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).
146. See id. at 1235-36. Specifically, the Division alleged that Blue Flame, an oil and
gas exploration company, violated Regulation D's prohibition against general solicitation.
Id. at 1235 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2008)).
147. Id. at 1241 (arguing that the NSMIA "only prohibits state law from regulating se-
curities that actually are 'covered securities"').
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Unlike previous decisions construing the preemption-by-
exemption issue, the Ohio Court of Appeals engaged in a detailed
analysis. The court began by outlining its method of review.14 8
Though "[t]he ultimate touchstone of any preemption analysis is
congressional intent," such intent can be "explicitly stated in a
statute's language or implicitly contained in the structure and
purpose" of the legislation.14 9 Further, if the preemption provi-
sion in a statute is ambiguous, "a court has a duty to accept the
reading that disfavors preemption, particularly in areas of tradi-
tional state regulation."150 In other words, a federal statute can
expressly preempt state regulation, but it should be clearly as-
serted on the face of the statute. Applying this analytical scheme
to the NSMIA, the court found the statute unambiguous.151 A
private offering was only a covered security, and thus capable of
preempting state law, "if it 'is exempt from registration ... "'152
Like Hamby, the court rejected Temple on two grounds.153 First,
the NSMIA's preemption language is unambiguous, and Temple
crafted an alternative reading by consulting the statute's legisla-
tive history.154 Second, the Temple reading permits issuers to
avoid liability under state law by merely averring compliance
with Regulation D.155 Because the NSMIA only preempted state
blue sky law when the challenged securities were actually exempt
under Rule 506, and Blue Flame violated Regulation D by engag-
ing in general advertising, the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded the trial court's decision.156
I. Brown v. Earthboard Sports USA, Inc.
Prior to Brown v. Earthboard Sports USA, Inc., only state
courts and federal district courts had ruled on the preemption-by-
exemption question.15 7 The Sixth Circuit's decision holding "that
148. See id. at 1241-42.
149. Id. at 1242.
150. Id. (citing Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005)).
151. Id. at 1243.
152. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4) (2006)).
153. Id. at 1244 ("We find Temple and its progeny unpersuasive.").
154. Id. ("[I]ntent is irrelevant if the statute is unambiguous."); see also Grubka v. Web-
Access Int'l, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1270 (D. Colo. 2006).
155. See In re Blue Flame, 871 N.E.2d at 1244; see also Grubka, 445 F. Supp. 2d at
1270.
156. See In re Blue Flame, 871 N.E.2d at 1244, 1250.
157. See 481 F.3d 901, 909-10 (6th Cir. 2007).
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offerings must actually qualify for a valid federal securities regis-
tration exemption in order to enjoy NSMIA preemption," was cer-
tainly a major victory for Buist and its progeny.i5s As a survey of
decisions subsequent to Brown illustrates, it remains to be seen
whether state or federal courts will ever revive the Temple line of
reasoning.159
In Brown, the plaintiff, Brown, was induced to invest $600,000
in Earthboard Sports when his financial advisor, Vaughn, told
him Vans Shoe Company was prepared to acquire Earthboard
Sports and offer a two-for-one stock exchange.1 60 The falsified
transaction never closed and the scheme was revealed to be frau-
dulent.1 61 Brown sued Vaughn and Earthboard, but the District
Court held that the Kentucky blue sky law was preempted by the
NSMIA because the challenged securities were offered pursuant
to Rule 506 of Regulation D.162 On appeal, Brown argued the se-
curities were not exempt from federal registration and the
NSMIA could not preempt state law unless the offering was ac-
tually exempt under Rule 506.163
The court acknowledged the preemption-by-exemption split
and recognized that it was the first federal appeals court to rule
on the issue. 164 The court rejected the holding in Temple, basing
its argument on the NSMIA's plain statutory language and the
policy justification for requiring actual compliance. 165 Although
legislative history may be helpful in cases of ambiguity, the court
emphasized that Congress could have, but did not, completely
preempt the field of state blue sky regulation.1 66 Further,
preempting state law whenever offerings add boilerplate lan-
guage purporting to qualify for federal exemption would evisce-
rate the investor protections of state registration.167 In the end,
158. See id. at 910.
159. See infra Part III.J-L.
160. Brown, 481 F.3d at 905-07.
161. Id. at 908.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 909.
164. Id. at 909-10.
165. Id. at 911-12.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 911.
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the Sixth Circuit agreed with Buist, becoming the highest court to
rule on the issue.168
J. Apollo Capital Fund v. Roth Capital Partners
The California Court of Appeals took the next foray into the
preemption-by-exemption debate in December 2007.169 In Apollo
Capital Fund v. Roth Capital Partners, a group of investors sued
an Internet company for securities fraud and failure to register
under federal and state law. 170 Roth Capital argued that the
NSMIA preempted Apollo's state claim "regardless of wheth-
er the private placement actually complied with... Regulation D
.... "171 Apollo contended that an offering was not a covered se-
curity unless it met the substantive requirements of Regulation
D.172 The trial court found preemption, but the appellate court
reversed, choosing to align itself with the line of authorities
"which have 'stated the obvious: a security has to actually be a
'covered security' before federal preemption applies."'173 Although
the court offered little independent analysis, it referenced the
well-reasoned criticism of Temple in recent decisions and placed
particular emphasis on Brown's federal appellate authority.174
Because Roth Capital's compliance with Regulation D presented
material factual issues, the appellate court concluded that the
trial court erred in sustaining Roth Capital's demurrer.175
K. Consolidated Management Group, L.L.C. v. Department of
Corps.
In Consolidated Management Group, L.L.C. v. Department of
Corps., a Kansas limited liability company formed and sold inter-
168. Id. at 922.
169. See Apollo Capital Fund v. Roth Capital Partners, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 199 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007).
170. Id. at 205.
171. Id. at 219. Roth Capital relied on Temple and the fact that they filed a Form D
with the SEC. Id. (quoting Temple v. Gorman, 201 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1244 (S.D. Fla.
2002)).
172. Id.
173. Id. (quoting Hamby v. Clearwater Consulting Concepts, 428 F. Supp. 2d 915, 921
n.2 (E.D. Ark. 2006)).
174. Id. at 219-220.
175. Id. at 220.
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ests in several general partnerships.176 The company did not reg-
ister the securities offerings with the state of California, but did
file Form D notices of private placements with the SEC pursuant
to Rule 506.177 When the offerings failed to meet the substantive
requirements of Rule 506, the California Department of Corpora-
tions issued Consolidated a desist and refrain order.178 Consoli-
dated challenged the order on the grounds of federal preemption,
arguing that "any purported offer of securities pursuant to Rule
506 of Regulation D is sufficient to establish preemption, whether
or not the offer is implemented in accordance with the require-
ments of that rule."179
The court extensively detailed Consolidated's position, which
largely tracked the reasoning in Temple.iS0 The court then out-
lined the majority and minority positions in the preemption-by-
exemption debate, ultimately holding that a security must actual-
ly comply with Rule 506 in order for state registration require-
ments to be preempted.181 The court based its decision on two ra-
tionales. First, the plain language of the statute "defines a
'covered security' as one that is exempt from registration .... "182
Because state law is only preempted by a covered security, an of-
fering must be exempt from registration for the NSMIA preemp-
tion provision to apply.18 3 Second, if state registration require-
ments were preempted by any private placement offered
pursuant to Rule 506, the law would effectively provide a blue-
print for unscrupulous issuers wishing to avoid state registra-
tion. 184 The plain language of the statute, combined with the pol-
icy of fraud prevention, led the court to align itself with Brown
and other courts rejecting Temple.
176. See 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 795, 800 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
177. See id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 802.
180. See id. at 802-03.
181. See id. at 803-04.
182. Id. at 803 (quoting In re Blue Flame Energy Corp., 871 N.E.2d 1227, 1244 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2008)) (emphasis omitted).
183. See id (quoting Brown v. Earthboard Sports USA, Inc., 481 F.3d 901, 910 (6th Cir.
2007)).
184. See id. at 803-04 (quoting Brown, 481 F.3d at 911).
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L. Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, Inc.
Like Minnesota's federal district court,1s5 the Minnesota Court
of Appeals concluded that a private securities offering did not ac-
tually have to comply with Regulation D for the NSMIA to
preempt state registration law.18 6 The Risdall action stemmed
from the sale of unregistered securities to the Risdall family.187
The trial court rejected Brown-Wilbert's preemption argument
and granted summary judgment to the Risdalls on their Minneso-
ta claim.1S8 The appellate court reversed, holding that a private
securities offering purporting to be exempt under Regulation D
should be governed exclusively by federal law and any claim un-
der state law should be preempted.18 9 Because federal courts
were more qualified than state courts to review issues of federal
law, the court reasoned, federal courts should be the only judges
of the availability of a Regulation D exemption. 190
Brown-Wilbert's victory was short-lived, however. In July 2008,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota granted the Risdalls' appeal to
determine "whether federal law preempts state registration re-
quirements with respect to securities that purport to be, but are
not in fact, federal covered securities."191 Like the Sixth Circuit
in Brown, the Supreme Court of Minnesota emphasized the im-
portance of Congressional intent when considering whether a fed-
eral law preempted a state statute. 192 The best evidence of Con-
gressional intent, the court noted, was the express language of
the federal statute at issue.193 The court found that "[t]he court of
appeals disregarded the plain language of 15 U.S.C. § 77r and
Rule 506 . . . ."194 Specifically, the preemption provision of section
77r only applies to "a security that.., is a covered security."195
185. See Pinnacle Commc'ns Int'l, Inc. v. Am. Family Mortgage Corp., 417 F. Supp. 2d
1073, 1087 (D. Minn. 2006).
186. See Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, Inc., 733 N.W.2d 827, 832 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
187. Id. at 829.
188. Id. at 830.
189. Id. at 832. Though the court found the challenged securities offering in compliance
with Regulation D, the court based its decision on the Temple-Lillard-Pinnacle line of rea-
soning, not the lower court's flawed Rule 506 analysis. Id. at 832-33.
190. Id. at 832.
191. Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, Inc., 753 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Minn. 2008).
192. Id. at 728 (citing Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987)).
193. Id. (citing Dahl v. Charles Schwab & Co., 545 N.W.2d 918, 922 (Minn. 1996)).
194. Id. at 729.
195. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(1)(A) (2006)) (emphasis added). The court also cited
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Noting that the majority of courts weighing in on the preemption-
by-exemption debate have found that actual compliance is neces-
sary for preemption, the court found "that federal law does not
preempt state registration requirements with respect to securities
that purport to be, but are not in fact, federal covered securi-
ties."19 6
IV. THE MERITS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EXEMPTION-BY-
PREEMPTION ISSUE
As the preceding survey demonstrates, recent case law has
strongly supported the majority proposition that a defendant
must prove NSMIA preemption by establishing a Rule 506 ex-
emption. Commentators 97 and the Sixth Circuit 9 8 have struck
serious blows to the minority, and opinions supporting Temple's
initial declaration have diminished in regularity. Lillard, for ex-
ample, summarily adopted the Temple approach shortly after the
Temple decision;199 Pinnacle contained little independent analy-
to section 77r(b)(4)(D) for the proposition that a security is only a covered security when it
is exempt from registration, and to Rule 506 for the qualification that a private offering
will only be exempt if the offering satisfies all the terms and conditions of the rule. Id. (cit-
ing 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2008)).
196. Id. at 729-31. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Minnesota criticized the Tem-
ple court's reliance on the House of Representatives Commerce Committee Report accom-
panying the NSMIA. See id. at 730 (citing Temple v. Gorman, 201 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1243
(S.D. Fla. 2002)). In Temple, the Southern District of Florida relied on the Report language
"offered or sold pursuant to a Commission rule or regulation" to justify its decision that
securities offered pursuant to, but not actually qualifying, for federal exemption would
nonetheless be treated as federal covered securities. Temple, v. Gorman 201 F. Supp. 2d.
1238, 1243-44 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 32 (1996), reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3894-95. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, however, construed
the language "pursuant to" in accordance with its Black's Law Dictionary definition of "[i] n
compliance with." Risdall, 753 N.W.2d at 730 n.6 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1272
(8th ed. 2004)). As such, the Report "actually suggests that compliance with the private
offering exemption is required for federal law to preempt Minnesota's registration re-
quirements." Id.
197. See, e.g., 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAWS OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.24[41
(5th ed. 2005) (rejecting the Temple opinion as contrary to plain statutory language); see
also 1 STUART R. COHN, SECURITIES COUNSELING FOR SMALL AND EMERGING COMPANIES §
6:24.50 (Cum. Supp. 2007) (setting up the preemption-by-exemption debate and siding
with Buist); Makens, supra note 134, at 554.
198. See Brown v. Earthboard Sports USA, Inc., 481 F.3d 901, 910 (6th Cir. 2007).
199. See Lillard v. Stockton, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1116 (N.D. Okla. 2003). Lillard's
precedential value is further hampered by a decision from Lillard's sister district in Odor
v. Rose, No. CIV-07-554-R, 2008 WL 2557607 (W.D. Okla. June 20, 2008). While the
court's decision in Odor failed to add any substantive gloss on the preemption-by-
exemption debate, it did recognize that a defendant asserting preemption has the burden
of proving its offering complied with SEC rules and regulations, and was thus a covered
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sis;200 and the Risdall decision was swiftly overturned by the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota. 201 While the question discussed in
these cases is an admittedly narrow issue, it is an important one.
Since 2002, several courts have addressed the issue for the first
time, and more issuers are beginning to use Rule 506 offerings to
avoid state registration. 202 Posing the merits of each position
against the greater role of federalism in the securities field, there-
fore, is not only a worthy task, but an essential one.
A. The Merits of the Majority Position
The majority position-that an offering must actually comply
with Rule 506 to preempt state law-rests on the twin pillars of
statutory interpretation and public policy.203 The strongest ar-
gument is based on a plain reading of the NSMIA, which states
that "[a] security is a covered security with respect to a transac-
tion that is exempt from registration . *..."204 While the statute
also notes that securities can be covered "pursuant to ... Com-
mission rules or regulations," 205 the SEC has consistently de-
clined to define all securities as covered, opting instead for an ex-
clusive set of preconditions for federal exemption. 206 If the statute
is plain, the argument continues, legislative history is irrele-
vant.207 After all, states are only prohibited from regulating a
security for purposes of the NSMIA. See id. at *2. Considering the Western District of Ok-
lahoma's tacit disapproval of Lillard, coupled with Lillard's own precedential limits, it is
questionable whether the Northern District of Oklahoma would reach the same conclusion
if it were again confronted with facts similar to those in Lillard.
200. See Pinnacle Commc'ns Int'l, Inc. v. Am. Family Mortgage Corp., 417 F. Supp. 2d
1073, 1087 (D. Minn. 2006).
201. See Risdall, 753 N.W.2d at 730-31, 734.
202. See COHN, supra note 197, at § 6.24:50.
203. Although Buist was the first court to reject Temple and thereby articulate what
became to be the majority view, see Buist v. Time Domain Corp., 926 So. 2d 290, 297-98
(Ala. 2005), Grubka was arguably the first decision to outline the rationale behind that
decision. See Grubka v. WebAccess Int'l, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1270 (D. Colo. 2006).
204. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4) (2006) (emphasis added).
205. Id. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (emphasis added).
206. See Brown v. Earthboard Sports USA, Inc., 481 F.3d 901, 911-12 (6th Cir. 2007)
("[it is dispositive to our inquiry that Congress chose not to include broadly preemptive
language when it enacted NSMIA .... [F]ar from defining 'covered securities' in a manner
that generally incorporates all securities, the SEC has promulgated specific requirements
that must be met in order for a security to be 'covered."').
207. See Violette v. P.A. Days, Inc., 427 F.3d 1015, 1017 (6th Cir. 2005) ("To avoid a
law's plain meaning in the absence of ambiguity would trench upon the legislative powers
vested in Congress by... the Constitution.") (quoting Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev. v.
Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 134-35 (2002)).
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covered security, and a security is not covered unless it is exempt
from federal registration with the SEC.208
The statutory argument dovetails nicely with the policy ratio-
nale behind requiring actual compliance with Rule 506. The basic
thrust of the majority's policy argument is a natural extension of
the central commandment of securities regulation: to protect in-
vestors from fraudulent tactics. 209 If issuers were able to avoid
state regulation by simply offering their securities under Rule
506 and claiming compliance, then a critical layer of protection
would be eliminated and the risk of investor fraud would be sub-
stantially heightened.210 The fear of an under-regulated securi-
ties field is supported by the state of the market preceding the
1929 crash 211 and recent examples of scofflaws manipulating se-
curities laws and defrauding investors. 212
B. The Merits of the Minority Position
The minority position-that an offering only needs to be offered
pursuant to Rule 506 to preempt state law-is supported by the
sweeping language of the NSMIA's legislative history, the policy
of avoiding duplicative securities regulation, and the basic argu-
ment that federal courts are better equipped to interpret and en-
force federal law. Temple epitomized the minority's heavy re-
liance on legislative intent.213 The intent to designate the federal
208. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r.
209. See supra Part II.A.
210. See, e.g., Brown, 481 F.3d at 911 ("In such a [Temple] world, state registration re-
quirements could be avoided merely by adding spurious boilerplate language to subscrip-
tion agreements suggesting that the offerings were 'covered,' or by filing bogus documents
with the SEC."); Grubka v. WebAccess Int'l, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1270 (D. Colo.
2006) ("[T]hat a defendant could avoid liability under state law simply by declaiming its
alleged compliance with Regulation D is an unsavory proposition and would eviscerate the
statute."); COHN, supra note 197, at § 6:24.50 ("Unless courts require at a minimum a bona
fide effort to comply with Rule 506, the mere assertion of a form would control, and sham
Rule 506 offerings would be exempt from state registration or exemption laws."); 12
JOSEPH C. LONG, BLUE SKY LAW § 3:81 n.7 (2008) ("If all that was required for preemption
was a bald-face statement that the offering was made under Rule 506, then any con artist
could avoid state registration by telling the investor that the offering was a private place-
ment under Rule 506.").
211. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Brown, 481 F.3d. at 905-09 (describing how a corporate investor and a
financial advisor defrauded a wealthy investor out of a substantial amount of money by
fabricating a merger).
213. See Temple v. Gorman, 201 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1243 (S.D. Fla. 2002) ('The purpose
of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption case."') (quoting Fla. E. Coast
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government as the sole regulator of national securities offerings,
the Temple Court explained, was effectively an intent to preempt
state blue sky law for any offering purporting to qualify for ex-
emption under Rule 506.214 Because the NSMIA was designed to
overhaul and unify the dual regulatory system through federal
preemption, 215 strictly interpreting the statute to permit state
evaluation of federal exemption and registration requirements
would be directly contradictory to the congressional purpose. 216
Viewed in the context of the NSMIA's sister statutes, the PSLRA
and the SLUSA, the Congressional attack on state authority can-
not be denied.217
The minority's second argument flows directly from its first.
The rationale behind injecting the federal government with a
broad grant of preemption was the perceived need to avoid the
duplicity of the current registration process. 218 In a case predat-
ing the preemption-by-exemption debate, the Second Circuit aptly
described the purpose of the NSMIA:
The primary purpose of NSMIA was to preempt State "Blue Sky"
laws which required issuers to register many securities with state
authorities prior to marketing in the state. By 1996, Congress recog-
nized the redundancy and inefficiencies inherent in such a system
and passed NSMIA to preclude states from requiring issuers to reg-
ister or qualify certain securities with state authorities. 2 1 9
The minority argues that the need to promote capital formation
outweighs the exaggerated threat of heightened investor fraud.220
States not only retain the authority to prosecute fraud within
their jurisdiction, 221 but there are available federal remedies un-
Ry. Co. v. City of W. Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2001)).
214. See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3877, 3878).
215. See Campbell, supra note 1, at 203 ("Judged by the rhetoric of its legislative histo-
ry, the [NSMIA] was intended to be revolutionary regarding the dual control by the federal
government and states over the sale of securities and the capital formation process.").
216. See Opening Brief of Appellants at 22, Consolidated Management Group, L.L.C. v.
California Dep't of Corps., 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 795 (Ct. App. 2008) (No. 05-1256) [hereinafter
Opening Brief of Appellant].
217. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
218. See H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877,
3878.
219. Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 2001).
220. See Final Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 20, Brown v. Earthboard Sports USA,
Inc., 481 F.3d 901 (6th Cir. 2007) (No 05-6317) [hereinafter Final Brief of Defendant-
Appellee].
221. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c) (2006); see also Houston v. Seward & Kissel, L.L.P., No.
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der section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act.222 To hold that states
may evaluate an issuer's compliance with federal registration re-
quirements contradicts the entire purpose of the NSMIA to avoid
dual levels of capital compliance.223 Likewise, there is a slippery
slope involved. Jurisdictions are bound to interpret Regulation D
differently, producing an amalgam of conflicting regulatory ob-
stacles for issuers to overcome. 224 To permit such state-to-state
inconsistency would only invite the very regulatory encumbrances
that Congress tried to remedy when it enacted the NSMIA.
The minority also argues that federal courts are more qualified
to interpret federal law.225 While this premise can be seriously
questioned,226 "[t]he magnitude of the federal interest in protect-
ing the integrity and efficient operation of the market for nation-
ally traded securities cannot be overstated."227 In essence, then,
this third rationale builds from the basic policy arguments that
broad federal preemption is the best way to ensure a uniform sys-
tem of securities regulation. Because the federal interest in-and
the societal need for-capital growth is so strong, the goals of the
NSMIA should not be so easily discarded.
C. The Future Role of Federalism in Securities Regulation
Although Brown may have turned Temple into an endangered
species, the process of debating the preemption-by-exemption is-
sue is probably more important than the end result. Most nota-
07cv6305, 2008 WL 818745, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2008) (finding that the NSMIA
does not preempt Oregon's securities fraud statutes).
222. See 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2006); see also Final Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note
220, at 22 (stating that the exclusive cause of action "to assert a claim that a private offer-
ing issued pursuant to § 4(2) was, in actuality, a public offering that should have been reg-
istered under § 5 ... is under § 12(a)(1) for the sale of unregistered securities").
223. See Opening Brief of Appellant, supra note 216, at 26 ("[R]equiring issuers to
prove compliance with federal exemptions to the satisfaction of state regulators flies in the
face of Congress's clear intent to reduce duplicative regulatory burdens on securities offer-
ings and thereby facilitate access to capital markets.").
224. See id.
225. See Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, Inc., 733 N.W.2d 827, 832 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007)
("Because federal courts are uniquely qualified to address issues of federal law, such as
the availability of a Regulation D exemption, we conclude that the better view is that an
offering purporting to be exempt under Regulation D is governed exclusively by federal
law, and any claim under state law relating to the offering is therefore preempted.").
226. See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal
Statutes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1501 (2006) (discussing the importance of state courts in the
interpretation of federal statutes).
227. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 78 (2006).
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bly, the judicial dialogue highlights the diminishing role of states
in the face of inevitable securities reform. The passage of the
PSLRA, the NSMIA, the SLUSA, and even Sarbanes-Oxley lends
credence to the notion that lawmakers are content to replace the
dual regulatory system through the gradual federalization of the
securities field.228 While states retain a necessary degree of in-
trastate prosecutorial authority,229 the allocation of regulatory
power will need to be revisited regardless of whether the Temple
doctrine flourishes. If Temple survives-a highly suspect proposi-
tion considering the NSMIA's plain statutory language-more
federal circuits will be forced to address the split. If Brown be-
comes the unanimous view, as most believe it should, courts will
begin to interpret the many provisions of Regulation D uniquely,
producing a "balkanized array" of legal doctrines which will perp-
lex issuers and demand reconciliation. 230
While it is generally undisputed that the securities field is in
need of some reform, the substance of that reform takes many
shapes. Most acknowledge that Congress, under the Commerce
Clause, could preempt the entire field of securities regulation,231
but few are willing to go to such extremes. 232 Rather, many view
the inherent struggle between states and the federal government
positively, as the dual vestiges of regulatory power work in con-
cert to fill gaps and enhance the capital market. 233 Like total
preemption, however, there is also basic disagreement over the
scope of state authority within the dual system. 234 For now, it is
sufficient that Congress, with the NSMIA, has foreshadowed the
"creeping federalization" of the securities market. 235 The courts
and the policymakers will revisit securities reform in the near fu-
228. See A. Brooke Overby, Our New Commercial Law Federalism, 76 TEMP. L. REV.
297, 321 (2003) (describing the federal government's increased occupation of commercial
law authority as "the phenomenon of creeping federalization").
229. The investigation of Wall Street analyst conflicts conducted by Elliot Spitzer un-
der the Martin Act, which eventually led to a large global settlement, is a great example of
how the states can use their prosecutorial authority to ferret out securities fraud and de-
ceit. See Dynamic Federalism, supra note 1, at 118-19.
230. See Denos, supra note 1, at 125 (describing state blue sky laws as a "balkanized
array of statutes").
231. See Overby, supra note 228, at 321 (noting Congress's expansive power under the
Commerce Clause).
232. But see Dorsch, supra note 9, at 393. Dorsch lays out a detailed plan of total
preemption, an event which he believes the NSMIA has already foreshadowed. See id.
233. See Warren, supra note 38, at 497.
234. Compare id. at 497-98, with Dorsch, supra note 9, at 387-93.
235. See Overby, supra note 228, at 321.
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ture, and the judicial dialogue permeating the preemption-by-
exemption debate will be an essential tool in the development of
an effective securities regime.
V. CONCLUSION
Seeking to grease the wheels of capital formation without ab-
andoning the historical commitment to investor protection,236 the
NSMIA reversed seventy years of thinking by attempting to re-
place the dual regulatory system with a broad grant of federal
preemption. 23 7 Despite this grandiose vision, application of the
NSMIA's preemptive scheme has been severely limited by the
statutory definition of a covered security as "a transaction that is
exempt from registration .... "238 Passing arguments can be made
to support the preemption of state law for all Rule 506 offerings,
but it is nearly impossible to combat the unambiguous language
of the statute. Recent case law has sharply criticized Temple's
minority approach, 239 and it is unlikely that future courts will
endorse an interpretation that permits issuers to evade state lia-
bility by hiding behind Rule 506.240 Nevertheless, the issue of
whether a defendant must prove preemption by proving exemp-
tion remains a viable one, if only for the impact the discussion
can have on impending securities reform. In all likelihood, the
NSMIA has failed to accomplish what it set out to do: designate
the federal government as the sole regulator of national securities
offerings.241 The resolution, and more importantly, the discussion
of the preemption-by-exemption debate, contains valuable lessons
as lawmakers contemplate how to allocate state and federal pow-
er to achieve the noble balance of investor protection and capita-
listic growth.
Jeffrey D. Chadwick
236. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
237. See Does Federalism Matter?, supra note 2, at 894.
238. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4) (2006) (emphasis added).
239. See, e.g., Brown v. Earthboard Sports USA, Inc., 481 F.3d 901, 911-12 (6th Cir.
2007).
240. See id. at 911.
241. See H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877,
3878.

